Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 449–466

Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition


DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9213-3

Cite this article as:
Thompson, J.R. Phenom Cogn Sci (2012) 11: 449. doi:10.1007/s11097-011-9213-3


In this paper, I examine the plausibility of Embodied Accounts of Social Cognition by finding fault with the most detailed and convincing version of such an account, as articulated by Daniel Hutto (2008). I argue that this account fails to offer a plausible ontogeny for folk psychological abilities due to its inability to address recent evidence from implicit false belief tasks that suggest a radically different timeline for the development of these abilities.


Embodied cognitionTheory of MindFalse beliefSocial cognitionDevelopment

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and ReligionMississippi State UniversityMississippi StateUSA