Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 449-466

First online:

Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition

  • J. Robert ThompsonAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy and Religion, Mississippi State University Email author 

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In this paper, I examine the plausibility of Embodied Accounts of Social Cognition by finding fault with the most detailed and convincing version of such an account, as articulated by Daniel Hutto (2008). I argue that this account fails to offer a plausible ontogeny for folk psychological abilities due to its inability to address recent evidence from implicit false belief tasks that suggest a radically different timeline for the development of these abilities.


Embodied cognition Theory of Mind False belief Social cognition Development