Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition
- J. Robert Thompson
- … show all 1 hide
Purchase on Springer.com
$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
In this paper, I examine the plausibility of Embodied Accounts of Social Cognition by finding fault with the most detailed and convincing version of such an account, as articulated by Daniel Hutto (2008). I argue that this account fails to offer a plausible ontogeny for folk psychological abilities due to its inability to address recent evidence from implicit false belief tasks that suggest a radically different timeline for the development of these abilities.
- Asch, S. (1952). Social psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. CrossRef
- Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010). False-belief understanding in infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(3), 110–118. CrossRef
- Buttlemann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 112, 337–342. CrossRef
- Caron, A. J. (2009). Comprehension of the representational mind in infancy. Developmental Review, 29, 69–95. CrossRef
- Friedman, O., & Leslie, A. M. (2007). The conceptual underpinnings of pretense: Pretending is not 'behaving-as-if'. Cognition, 105, 103–124. CrossRef
- Friedman, O., Neary, K. R., Burnstein, C. L., & Leslie, A. M. (2010). Is young children's recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 3-year-olds' understanding of pretend sounds and speech. Cognition, 115, 314–319. CrossRef
- Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Gallagher, S. (2007). Pathologies in narrative structure. In D. D. Hutto (Ed.), Narrative and understanding persons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gendler, T. S. (2010). Intuition, imagination, and philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press. CrossRef
- He, Z., Bolz, M., & Baillargeon, R. (2011). False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: Evidence from violation of expectation change-of-location and unexpected-contents tasks. Developmental Science, 14(2), 292–305.
- Hutto, D. D. (2008). Folk psychological narratives: The sociological basis of understanding reasons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hutto, D. D. (2009). ToM rules, but it is not OK. In I. Leudar & A. Costall (Eds.), Against Theory of Mind (pp. 221–238). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hutto, D. D., & Ratcliffe, M. (Eds.). (2007). Folk psychology re-assessed. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Leudar, I., & Costall, A. (2009a). Introduction: Against 'Theory of Mind'. In I. Leudar & A. Costall (Eds.), Against Theory of Mind (pp. 1–18). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. CrossRef
- Leudar, I., & Costall, A. (Eds.). (2009b). Against Theory of Mind. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meltzoff, A. N., Gopnik, A., & Repacholi, B. M. (1999). Toddlers' understanding of intentions, desires and emotions: Explorations of the dark ages. In P. Zelazo, J. W. Astington, & D. R. Olson (Eds.), Developing theories of intention. Earlbaum: Mahwah, NJ.
- Moses, L. J. (2001). Executive accounts of theory-of-mind development. Child Development, 72(3), 688–690. CrossRef
- Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false belief? Science, 308, 255–258. CrossRef
- Penn, D. C., & Povenelli, D. (2007). On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a "theory of mind". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B(362), 731–744.
- Penn, D. C., & Povenelli, D. (2009). The comparative delusion: The "behavioristic"/"mentailistic" dichotomy in comarative theory of mind research. In R. Samuels & S. P. Stich (Eds.), Oxford handbook of philosophy and cognitive science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Perner, J. (2010). Who took the cog out of cognitive science? Mentalism in an era of anti-cognitivism. In P. Frensch & R. Schwarzer (Eds.), Cognition and neuropsychology: International perspectives on psychological science (Vol. 1, pp. 241–261). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
- Perner, J., & Ruffman, T. (2005). Infants' insight into the mind: How deep? Science, 308, 214–216. CrossRef
- Povenelli, D., & Vonk, J. (2004). We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind. Mind and Language, 19(1), 1–28. CrossRef
- Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking commonsense psychology: A critique of folk psychology, theory of mind, and simulation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ruffman, T., & Perner, J. (2005). Do infants really understand false belief? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(10), 462–463. CrossRef
- Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72(3), 696–701. CrossRef
- Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2009). Which penguin Is this? Attributing false beliefs about object identity at 18 months. Child Development, 80(4), 1172–1196. CrossRef
- Scott, R. M., Baillargeon, R., Song, H.-J., & Leslie, A. M. (2010). Attributing false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months. Cognitive Psychology, 61, 366–395. CrossRef
- Sober, E. (2011). Parsimony and models of animal minds. University of Wisconsin.
- Song, H.-J., & Baillargeon, R. (2008). Infants' reasoning about others' false perceptions. Developmental Psychology, 44(6), 1789–1795. CrossRef
- Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18(7), 587–592. CrossRef
- Southgate, V., Chevallier, C., & Csibra, G. (2010). Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’ referential communication. Developmental Science.
- Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18(7), 580–586. CrossRef
- Thompson, J. R. (2011). Stalking the representational mind. Mississippi State University.
- Tomasello, M., & Rakoczy, H. (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind and Language, 18(2), 121–147. CrossRef
- Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–684. CrossRef
- Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103–128. CrossRef
- Yazdi, A. A., German, T. P., Defeyter, M. A., & Siegal, M. (2006). Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the wole truth, and nothing but the truth. Cognition, 100, 343–368. CrossRef
- Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume 11, Issue 4 , pp 449-466
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Embodied cognition
- Theory of Mind
- False belief
- Social cognition
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy and Religion, Mississippi State University, P.O. Box JS, Mississippi State, MS, 39762, USA