Neo-pragmatic intentionality and enactive perception: a compromise between extended and enactive minds
- Katsunori Miyahara
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The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, which accepts both extended minds and non-human minds. In the area of philosophy of mind, there are two theories of intentionality based on such commonsense understandings: neo-behaviorism defended, e.g., by Daniel Dennett, and neo-pragmatism advocated, e.g., by Robert Brandom. Neither account is in full agreement with how people ordinarily use their commonsense understanding. Neo-pragmatism, however, can overcome its problem—its inability to explain why people routinely find intentionality in non-humans—by incorporating the phenomenological suggestion that interactional bodily skills determine how we perceive others’ intentionality. I call this integrative position embodied neo-pragmatism. I conclude that the extended view of the mind makes sense, without denying the existence of non-human minds, only by assuming embodied neo-pragmatism and hence the general idea of enactive perception.
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- Neo-pragmatic intentionality and enactive perception: a compromise between extended and enactive minds
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume 10, Issue 4 , pp 499-519
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Extended mind
- Enactive perception
- Non-human minds
- Interaction theory of social cognition
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro, Tokyo, 153-8902, Japan