Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 619–628

Embodied cognition

Authors

    • Department of Linguistics & Cognitive ScienceUniversity of Delaware
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-010-9175-x

Cite this article as:
Adams, F. Phenom Cogn Sci (2010) 9: 619. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9175-x

Abstract

Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and raises questions about some of the claims being made by supporters.

Keywords

Action-sentence compatibility effectAffordancesA-modal symbolsCognitionEmbodiedIndexical hypothesisMeaningSensibleSensori-motorSymbol-grounding

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010