Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 221–230

Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology

Authors

    • Department of PsychologyGoldsmiths College, University of London
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9033-z

Cite this article as:
Velmans, M. Phenom Cogn Sci (2007) 6: 221. doi:10.1007/s11097-006-9033-z

Abstract

Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind.

Key words

introspectionheterophenomenologycritical phenomenologyqualia

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006