Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp 271–278

Is the brain a memory box?

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-4069-z

Cite this article as:
Jacobson, A.J. Phenom Cogn Sci (2005) 4: 271. doi:10.1007/s11097-005-4069-z

Abstract

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.

Key Words

memoryreductionismnormative explanationcontentintentionality

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of HoustonHouston