Abstract
One major fault line in foundational theories of cognition is between the so-called “representational” and “non-representational” theories. Is it possible to formulate an intermediate approach for a foundational theory of cognition by defining a conception of representation that may bridge the fault line? Such an account of representation, as well as an account of correspondence semantics, is offered here. The account extends previously developed agent-based pragmatic theories of semantic information, where meaning of an information state is defined by its interface role, to a theory that accommodates a notion of representation and correspondence semantics. It is argued that the account can be used to develop an intermediate approach to cognition, by showing that the major sources of tension between “representational” and “non-representational” theories may be eased.
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Notes
Here I am not assuming much about when in the complexification of cognitive organization representations should be expected. It could be as early as bacterial organization, or it could be as late as human cognition. I take it for granted that human beings use representations. I suspect that single cell organisms do not. I acknowledge that representational mechanisms do not scream out of the lower lever descriptions of neuronal (or biochemical) organization of brains or cells. They are a theoretical abstraction. The contention is that they are an explanatory and architecturally useful one.
Again, some connectionists take a more complex position about this. See for example, Churchland (2012).
The levels of description here are different from the levels of analysis that Marr (1982) introduced. However, there exists a connection which will not be explored here.
Note that (1) is a programmatic assumption that is generally accepted by everybody that would consider an intermediate strategy desirable. Some philosophers, however, may accept (1) as an empirically correct but non-essential principle for studding cognition. To them I have nothing else to say here.
The earliest theory of semantic information that has a pragmatic dimension is due to MacKay (1969). A full-fledged PSI was developed by Nauta (1972) within the semiotic and cybernetic tradition, but in the following forty years there was little further development. More recently, a revival of PSI was attempted in (Vakarelov 2010). Floridi has also endorsed a form of PSI, more implicitly first (Floridi and Taddeo 2007), and more explicitly lately (Floridi 2011c, forthcoming).
It is possible to hold the view that notions such as meaning, content or representation presuppose some mental capacities that require or are equivalent to the possession of language (Davidson 2001; Gauker 1994). Such positions often depend on theories of intentionality that demand self-referential thoughts of complex propositional form. There are many examples of such approaches. For a very extreme example see (Baker 1981). Cognitive science has little use of such archaic theories of representation, so I will not take them seriously here. There are more sophisticated theories of semantics that also end up holding that semantization requires very sophisticated cognitive machinery that is coextensive with possession of language, even if, strictly speaking, the semantics does not derive from the language. Floridi (2011b) holds a similar view, for example. One possibility is that there is a terminological disagreement about what we call semantics. Even if the disagreement is more substantive, space will not allow to enter deeply in a debate with such a position here.
I cannot think of interesting ways of swopping the two roles, where aboutness relates to status and significance to content.
Vakarelov (2010) does not use explicitly Neander’s distinction.
For natural cognitive systems there is a further question about the source of the teleology. In Vakarelov (2011b) I resort to the idea, originally proposed in Maturana and Varela (1980), and developed in various places since, that autopoiesis, as an organizational system condition, is sufficient for natural teleology.
Nauta modulates the input and output process by other systems—receivers and emitters. The reception of information is also described as discriminable form or potential information (to be distinguished from actual information, which is always semantic). The idea is related to Ashby’s notion of transmission of variety (1956).
It is quite common to assume that semantics requires semantics for: a system is not a meaning-user if it is not a meaner. This idea is implicit in theories connecting meaning to intentionality, and in theories requiring interpretation. I regard this to be a grave mistake, and one of the biggest obstacles to naturalizing semantics. A program that attempts to explain meaning with an act of meaning is doomed to fail, because it tries to explain something simpler with something more complicated that presuppose it.
Although probably not formal tools yet. The complex organization of even simple cognitive systems is too great for the analytic machinery of modern dynamical systems theory, including exotic fields such as synergetics (Haken 1993, 2000). This is why an independent informational description is needed as an alternative discursive framework.
It is defined by a two-level gradient of abstraction, in the terminology of LoA theory (Floridi and Sanders 2004).
This example is intended only as a visualizable and intuitable (but cartoonish) illustration of the constructions. I am not implying that the constructions offer a realistic analysis of the example. The mechanisms involved in visual perception, conceptualization, etc., are considerably more complex that the machinery developed here can accommodate. Indeed, the machinery is intended to capture simple cognition. Unfortunately, simple cognitive systems do not provide intuitive illustrations of the constructions. In fact, one of the aims of the model developed here is to provide tools for the analysis of simple systems.
It is not assumed that identification of such macro-structure is possible in practice through analytic means, except for toy examples. It should not be expected that such identification would be entirely observer-independent. It only would be assumed that such macro-structure is possible to define. Formally, worse case scenario, the macro-structure is identical to the dynamical micro-structure of states. In this case, however, nothing interesting can be said about the system.
Note that it is always possible to define macro-structure on N if we have a macro-structure on M and a micro-state (dynamical) function f : M → N. Macro-states are simply sets of micro-states, every such set is mapped by f to a set of micro-states of N. The important question is whether this macro-structure is interesting for the operation of the organism.
The word ‘triangulation’ has various uses in different fields. Here I model a term from psychology related to in-group communication, where individuals that do not talk may communicate and coordinate through an intermediary.
For simplicity, I do not discuss the cases where O may have other sources as well, especially S.
Throughout, the word “virtual” is used in a technical sense. The suggested contrast is not between ontological status: virtual versus real. The contrast is between where the causal support lies, as in ‘computer generated, virtual reality’ versus ‘physical reality’—virtual as emulated, but not virtual as unreal.
Again, this is only a fanciful example. I am not endorsing a language of thought hypothesis here.
The more common way of saying this is that representations are ‘intentional’. Because of the various mentalistic connotations of ‘intentional’, I purposefully avoid using the word here.
I will not discuss this issue any further, as I have not attempted to investigate and dismiss alternative accounts. Instead, I offer directly a positive model. Comparative analysis is also needed, but will be the subject of future work.
Of course, this is not what the agent would say, had it had the further cognitive capacities to say things. The agent would think that it is representing the world.
The model allows for there to be both an actual and a virtual coupling between two media, if there are two different triangulation monitoring media, one of which defines the link internally. Something like this happens when we describe a causal link between two systems as defining a representation relation. In the process, inadvertently, we create a virtual link between the system. It is this virtual link, in our description, not the causal link, that produces the representation.
The discussion here is strictly about internal correspondence semantics for the agent. There may be different, non-correspondence internal semantics that are defined by different information media network structures. There may be internal interface semantics, for example. The machinery of IMNs offers, potentially, a wide array of possible semantic systems. This will be explored in future research.
In order to maintain simplicity, I am being a bit sloppy here. Technically, representation, as defined above, requires triangulation monitoring. So, when we say that O is monitored by T, what actually happens is that there is another medium O’ that is coupled to O and this coupling is monitored by T. O and O’ may be identical and may be coupled by an information processing operation (see section “Information Media Networks”) Making this idea precise would require a closer examination of the formalism of IMNs, which will distract from the aim of this article. Such ideas would be needed to make the definition of reflexivity more rigorous.
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Acknowledgments
This research was been supported by a New Faculty Fellows award from the American Council of Learned Societies, funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. I would like to thank the participants of the Fourth Workshop on the Philosophy of Information, University of Hertfordshire, UK. I would like also to thank Fred Dretske, Karen Neander, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Alexander Rosenberg for insightful discussion of aspects of this work, as well as the participants in a Duke Philosophy Colloquium, where parts of this work where presented. Finally, I would like to thank the insightful comments of the several anonymous referees.
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Vakarelov, O. From Interface to Correspondence: Recovering Classical Representations in a Pragmatic Theory of Semantic Information. Minds & Machines 24, 327–351 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-013-9318-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-013-9318-2