Computationalism: Still the Only Game in Town
- David Davenport
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Mental representations, Swiatczak (Minds Mach 21:19–32, 2011) argues, are fundamentally biochemical and their operations depend on consciousness; hence the computational theory of mind, based as it is on multiple realisability and purely syntactic operations, must be wrong. Swiatczak, however, is mistaken. Computation, properly understood, can afford descriptions/explanations of any physical process, and since Swiatczak accepts that consciousness has a physical basis, his argument against computationalism must fail. Of course, we may not have much idea how consciousness (itself a rather unclear plurality of notions) might be implemented, but we do have a hypothesis—that all of our mental life, including consciousness, is the result of computational processes and so not tied to a biochemical substrate. Like it or not, the computational theory of mind remains the only game in town.
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- Computationalism: Still the Only Game in Town
Minds and Machines
Volume 22, Issue 3 , pp 183-190
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Computational theory of mind
- Mental representation
- David Davenport (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Computer Engineering Department, Bilkent University, 06800, Ankara, Turkey