Hybrid Extensional Prototype Compositionality
First Online: 09 October 2010 Received: 19 March 2010 Accepted: 21 September 2010 DOI:
Cite this article as: Jylkkä, J. Minds & Machines (2011) 21: 41. doi:10.1007/s11023-010-9217-8 Abstract
It has been argued that prototypes cannot compose, and that for this reason concepts cannot be prototypes (Osherson and Smith in Cognition 9:35–58,
; Fodor and Lepore in Cognition 58:253–270, 1981 ; Connolly et al. in Cognition 103:1–22, 1996 ). In this paper I examine the intensional and extensional approaches to prototype compositionality, arguing that neither succeeds in their present formulations. I then propose a hybrid extensional theory of prototype compositionality, according to which the extension of a complex concept is determined as a function of what triggers its constituent prototypes. I argue that the theory escapes the problems traditionally raised against extensional theories of compositionality. 2007 Keywords Prototypes Compositionality Extensional compositionality Intensional compositionality References
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