Minds and Machines

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 423–439

Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyLouisiana State University
  • Jason Megil
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11023-010-9203-1

Cite this article as:
Cogburn, J. & Megil, J. Minds & Machines (2010) 20: 423. doi:10.1007/s11023-010-9203-1

Abstract

We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.

Keywords

MechanismChurch’s thesisComputational theory of mindDualismInferentialismPlatonismLucas-Penrose argumentBrandomDummettDetlefsenWright

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010