Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 31, Issue 4, pp 285–301

Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning

Authors

  • Tim Campbell
    • Department of PhilosophyRutgers University
    • Department of PhilosophyRutgers University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11017-010-9150-0

Cite this article as:
Campbell, T. & McMahan, J. Theor Med Bioeth (2010) 31: 285. doi:10.1007/s11017-010-9150-0

Abstract

We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.

Keywords

Animalism Personal identity Dicephalus Craniopagus parasiticus Cephalopagus Too-many-subjects problem

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010