Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
- McMahan, Jeff. 2002. The ethics of killing: Problems at the margins of life. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McMahan, Jeff. 1998. Brain death, cortical death, and persistent vegetative state. In A companion to bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, 250–260. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Miller, Kenneth. 1996. Together forever. Life April: 44–56.
- Olson, Eric. 2007. What are we?. New York: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Olson, Eric. 2004. Animalism and the corpse problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 265–274. CrossRef
- Olson, Eric. 2008. Replies. Special issue I. Abstracta 4: 32–42.
- Shoemaker, Sydney. 1999. Self, body and coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73: 287–306. CrossRef
- Shoemaker, Sydney. 2008. Persons, animals and identity. Synthese 162: 313–324. CrossRef
- Noonan, Harold. 1998. Animalism vs. Lockeanism: A current controversy. The Philosophical Quarterly 48: 302–318. CrossRef
- Baker, Lynne. 2007. The metaphysics of everyday life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Hershenov, David. 2005. Persons as proper parts of organisms. Theoria 71: 29–37.
- Liao, S. Matthew. 2006. The organism view defended. The Monist 89: 334–350.
- George, Robert, and Patrick Lee. 2008. Body-self dualism in contemporary ethics and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reid, Mark. Forthcoming. A case in which two persons are one animal. In Essays on animalism, ed. Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McMahan, Jeff. 2009. Death, brain death, and persistent vegetative state. In A companion to bioethics, 2nd ed, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, 286–298. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Olson, Eric. 1997. The human animal: Personal identity without psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hudson, Hud. 2001. A materialist metaphysics of the human person. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Shewmon, Alan. 1998. ‘Brain-stem death’, ‘brain death’ and death: A critical re-evaluation of the purported equivalence. Issues in Law and Medicine 14: 125–145.
- Hovorakova, M., R. Peterkova, Z. Likovsky, and M. Peterka. 2008. A case of conjoined twin’s Cephalothoracopagus Janiceps Disymmetros. Reproductive Toxicology 26: 178–182. CrossRef
- Kokcu, Arif, Mehmet B. Cetinkaya, Oguz Aydin, and Migraci Tosun. 2007. Conjoined twins: Historical perspective and report of a case. The Journal of Maternal-Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 20: 349–356. CrossRef
- Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
Volume 31, Issue 4 , pp 285-301
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Personal identity
- Craniopagus parasiticus
- Too-many-subjects problem