Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning
First Online: 11 July 2010 DOI:
Cite this article as: Campbell, T. & McMahan, J. Theor Med Bioeth (2010) 31: 285. doi:10.1007/s11017-010-9150-0 Abstract
We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
Keywords Animalism Personal identity Dicephalus Craniopagus parasiticus Cephalopagus Too-many-subjects problem
Authors Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan are “equal” co-authors. Their names are listed in alphabetical order.
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