Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 31, Issue 4, pp 285-301

First online:

Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning

  • Tim CampbellAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Rutgers University
  • , Jeff McMahanAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Rutgers University Email author 

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We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.


Animalism Personal identity Dicephalus Craniopagus parasiticus Cephalopagus Too-many-subjects problem