Continental Philosophy Review

, Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 71–88

Naturalising deconstruction

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyThe Open University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11007-005-9004-z

Cite this article as:
Roden, D. Cont Philos Rev (2005) 38: 71. doi:10.1007/s11007-005-9004-z

Abstract

Most contemporary readings of Derrida’s work situate it within a transcendental tradition of philosophical enquiry explicitly critical of naturalistic accounts of knowledge and mind. I argue that Derrida provides the naturalist with some of the philosophical resources needed to rebut transcendental critiques of naturalism, in particular the phenomenological critiques which derive from Husserl’s philosophy. I do this by showing: a) that Derrida’s account of temporality as differance undermines phenomenological accounts of the meaning of naturalistic theories and assumptions; and b) that it is itself both usable and interpretable within the naturalistic framework of current cognitive science.

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005