Barca, F., & Becht, M. (2001). The control of corporate Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bebchuk, L., & Roe, M. (1999). A theory of path dependence of corporate ownership and governance. Stanford Law Review,
Becht, M., & Boehmer, E. (2003). Voting control in German corporations. International Review of Law and Economics,
Becht, M., Franks, J. R., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. (2008). Returns to shareholder activism: Evidence from a clinical study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund. Review of Financial Studies, 1.
Boyson, N. M., & Mooradian, R. M., (2007). Hedge funds as shareholder activists from 1994-2005. Working Paper. Northeastern University.
Bratton, W. W. (2007). Hedge funds and governance targets. Georgetown Law Journal,
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F., & Thomas, R. S. (2006). Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance
. ECGI—Finance Working Paper No. 139/2006 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948907
Briggs, T. W. (2007). Corporate governance and the new hedge fund activism: An empirical analysis. Journal of Corporation Law, 32(4).
Bruner, R. (2004). Applied mergers and acquisitions. London: Wiley.
Cernat, L. (2004). The emerging European corporate governance model: Anglo-American, continental, or still the century of diversity? Journal of European Public Policy,
Clifford, C. (2008). Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists. Journal of Corporate Finance,
Coffee, J. (2000). Convergence and its critics: What are the preconditions to the separation of ownership and control? Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 170.
Comment, R., & Schwert, G. (1995). Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover devices. Journal of Financial Economics,
Crutchley, C. E., Hudson, C. D., & Jensen, M. R. H. (1998). Shareholder wealth effects of CalPERS’ activism. Financial Services Review,
de Jong, A., De Jong, D. V., Mertens, G. & Wasley, C. (2002). The role of self-regulation in corporate governance: Evidence from the Netherlands. Working paper.
Del Guercio, D., & Hawkins, J. (1999). The motivation and impact of pension fund activism. Journal of Financial Economics,
Dietl, H. M. (1998). Capital markets and corporate governance in Japan. Germany and the United States. Routledge.
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality. American Sociological Review,
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1991). Introduction. In W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1–38.
Drobetz, W., Schillhofer, A., & Zimmermann, H. (2004). Corporate governance and expected stock returns: Evidence from Germany. European Financial Management,
Edwards, T. (2004). Corporate governance, industrial relations and trends in company-level restructuring in Europe: Convergence towards the anglo-american model? Industrial Relations Journal,
Edwards, J., & Nibler, N. (2000). Corporate governance in Germany: The role of banks and ownership concentration. Economic Policy,
English, I. P. C., Smythe, T. I., & McNeil, C. R. (2004). The “CalPERS effect” revisited. Journal of Corporate Finance,
Eube, S. (1998). Der Aktienmarkt in Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Frankfurt am Main: Knapp.
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European companies. Journal of Financial Economics,
Franks, J. R., & Harris, R. S. (1989). Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers: The U.K. experience 1955–1985. Journal of Financial Economics,
Franks, J., & Mayer, C. (1996). Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure. Journal of Financial Economics,
Franks, J., & Mayer, C. (1998). Bank control, takeovers and corporate governance in Germany. Journal of Banking & Finance,
Franks, J., & Mayer, C. (2001). Ownership and control in Germany. Review of Financial Studies,
Gillan, S., & Starks, L. T. (2007). The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
Gilson, R. J. (2001). Globalizing corporate governance: Convergence of form or function. American Journal of Comparative Law,
Goergen, M., Manjon Antolin, M. C., & Renneboog, L. (2004). Recent developments in German corporate governance. International Review of Law and Economics,
Goergen, M., Manjon, M., & Renneboog, L. (2008). Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model? Journal of Management and Governance,
Goergen, M., & Renneboog, L. (2003). Why are the levels of control (so) different in German and UK companies? Evidence from initial public offerings. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Goergen, M., & Renneboog, L. (2008). Contractual corporate governance. Journal of Corporate Finance,
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Gompers, P. A., & Metrick, A. (2001). Institutional investors and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Gordon, J. N. (1999). Pathways to corporate convergence? Two steps on the road to shareholder capitalism in Germany. Columbia Journal of European Law,
Gordon, J. N., & Roe, M. J. (2004). Convergence and persistence in corporate governance
. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Gorton, G., & Schmid, F. (2000). Universal banking and the performance of German firms. Journal of Financial Economics,
Gregory, A. (1997). An examination of the long run performance of UK acquiring firms. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,
Hansman, H., & Kraakman, R. (2001). The end of history for corporate law. Reprinted, e.g. In: J. N. Gordon & M. J. Roe (2004). Convergence and persistence in corporate governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hellwig, M. (2000). On the economics and politics of corporate finance and corporate control. In X. Vives (Ed.), Corporate governance: Theoretical and empirical perspectives (pp. 95–134). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hopt, K. J. (2004). Corporate governance in Germany: Recent developments in company law and corporate governance code. In European corporate governance in company law and codes (Report prepared for the European Corporate Governance Conference of October 18, The Hague, The Netherlands).
Jenkinson, T., & Mayer, C. (1994). Hostile takeovers: Defence, attack and corporate governance. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance,
Kini, O., Kracaw, W., & Mian, S. (2004). The nature of discipline by corporate takeovers. Journal of Finance, American Finance Association,
Klein, A., & Zur, E. (2009). Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other private investors. Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
Krahnen, J. P., & Schmidt, R. H. (2004). The German financial system
. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics,
Lane, C. (2003). Changes in corporate governance of German corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-American model? ESRC Centre for Business Research, Working Papers wp259.
Limmack, R. J. (1991). Corporate mergers and shareholder wealth effects: 1977–1986. Accounting and Business Research,
Malatesta, P., & Walkling, R. (1988). The impact of poison pill securities on stockholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics,
McAndrews, J., & Stefanadis, C. (2002). The consolidation of European stock exchanges. Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 8(6).
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1994). Comparing equilibria. American Economic Review,
Nelson, J. M. (2006). The “CalPERS effect” revisited again. Journal of Corporate Finance,
Nesbitt, S. L. (1994). Long-term rewards from shareholder activism: A study of the ‘CalPERS’ effect. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
Opler, T. C. & Sokobin, J. (1995). Does coordinated institutional activism work? An analysis of the activities of the council of institutional investors. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, Working Papers Series 95-5. Available at SSRN.
Porter, M. (1992). Capital disadvantage: America’s failing capital investment system. Harvard Business Review, 65–83.
Renneboog, L. (2000). Ownership, managerial control and the governance of poorly performing companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange. Journal of Banking & Finance,
Rieckers, O., & Spindler, G. (2004). Corporate governance: Legal aspects. In J. Krahnen & R. Schmidt (Eds.), The German financial system
(pp. 350–385). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 11.CrossRef
Schmidt, R. H., & Spindler, G. (2002). Path dependence, corporate governance and complementarity. International Finance,
Seifert, W. G., & Voth, H. J. (2006). Invasion der Heuschrecken. Published by Econ. Only available in German.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance,
Sudarsanam, S. (2010). Creating value from mergers and acquisitions: The challenges (2nd ed.). FT Prentice Hall.
Sudarsanam, S., & Broadhurst, T. (2008). Shareholder engagement in the UK: Survey of motivations and practice. Cranfield School of Management Working Paper.
Sudarsanam, S., Holl, P., & Salami, A. (1996). Shareholder wealth gains in mergers: Effect of synergy and ownership structure. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,
Sudarsanam, P. S., & Huang, J. (2006). Managerial incentives and overconfidence: Impact of risk taking and acquirer value in mergers and acquisitions. 2006 Financial Management Association Annual Meeting paper.
Sudarsanam, S., & Mahate, A. A. (2003). Discussion of glamour acquirers, method of payment and post-acquisition performance: The UK evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,
Sudarsanam, S., & Mahate, A. (2006). Are friendly acquisitions too bad for shareholders and managers? Long-term value creation and top management turnover in hostile and friendly acquirers. British Journal of Management,
Windolf, P. (2002). Corporate networks in Europe and the United States. Administrative Science Quarterly,
Zattoni, A., & Cuomo, F. (2008). Why adopt codes of good governance? A comparison of institutional and efficiency perspectives. Corporate Governance, 16.