Anderson, R., & Reeb, D. (2003a). Family ownership, corporate diversification and firm leverage. Journal of Law and Economics,
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003b). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance,
Anderson, R., & Reeb, D. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 Firm. Administrative Science Quarterly,
Angel, P., & Fumás, V. (1997). The compensation of Spanish executives: A test of a managerial talent allocation model. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Athanassiou, N., Crittenden, W. F., Kelly, L. M., Marquez, P. (2002). Founder centrality effects on the Mexican family firm’s top management group: firm culture, strategic vision and goals, and firm performance. Journal of World Business, 37(2), 139–150.
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. theory. Journal of Finance,
Banker, R. D., & Datar, S. M. (1989). Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research,
Barak, R., Cohen, S., Lauterbach, B. (2008). The effect of CEO pay on firm valuation in closely held firms. Working paper available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098852
Barontini, R., & Caprio, L. (2006). The effect of ownership structure and family control on firm value and performance. Evidence from Continental Europe. European Financial Management,
Barontini, R., Siciliano, G., (2003). Equity prices and the risk of expropriation: An analysis of the Italian stock market. ECGI—Finance working paper no. 24/2003.
Barucci, E., Falini, J. (2007). Executive remuneration with concentrated ownership: Rent extraction or optimal contracts. Working paper.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J.M. (2004). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. M., & Walker, D. (2001). Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation. University of Chicago Law Review,
Bianchi, M., & Bianco, M. (2006). Italian corporate governance in the last 15 years: From pyramid sto coalitions? ECGI—finance working paper no. 144/2006.
Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, K. (2006). CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance,
Brunello, G., Graziano, C., & Parigi, B. (2001). Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Cadbury, A. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. London, United Kingdom: Geeand Co. Ltd.
Campbell, J. (1996). Understanding risk and return. Journal of Political Economy,
Carrasco Hernandez, A., Sanchez-Marin, G. (2007). The determinants of employee compensation in family firms: Empirical evidence. Family business review, 20(3), 215–228.
Cavalluzzo, K., Sankaraguruswamy, S. (2000). Pay-to-accounting performance and ownership structure in privately-held small corporations. Working paper.
Cheng, S., & Firth, M. (2005). Ownership, corporate governance and top management pay in Hong Kong. Managerial and Decision Economics,
Cheung, Y. L., Stouraitis, A., & Wong, A. (2003). Ownership concentration and executive compensation in closely held firms: Evidence from Hong Kong. HKIMR working paper. N. 13.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholders. Journal of Finance,
Cohen, S., & Lauterbach, B. (2008). Differences in pay between owner and non-owner CEOs: Evidence from Israel. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,
Corbetta, G., & Tomaselli, S. (1996). Boards of directors in Italian family business. Family Business Review,
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. H., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics,
Crespi, R., & Gispert, C. (1998). Board remuneration, performance and corporate governance in large Spanish companies. SSRN working paper.
Cyert, R. M., Kang, S.-H., & Kumar, P. (2002). Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-management compensation: Theory and evidence. Management Science,
Cyert, R., Kang, S., Kumar, P., Shah, A. (1997). Corporate governance and the level of CEO compensation. Working paper, Carnegie Mellon University.
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review,
DeAngelo, H., & DeAngelo, L. (2000). Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: A study of the Times Mirror Company. Journal of Financial Economics,
Denis, D., Denis, D., & Sarin, A. (1997). Ownership structure and top executive turnover. Journal of Financial Economics,
Duffhues, P., & Kabir, R. (2008). Is the pay–performance relationship always positive? Evidence from the Netherlands. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,
Dyl, E. A. (1988). Corporate control and management compensation: Evidence on the agency problem. Managerial and Decision Economics,
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics,
European Commission (2009), Commission Recommendation IP/09/673.
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations’. Journal of Financial Economics,
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics,
Fernandes, N. (2008). Board compensation and firm performance: The role of “Independent” board members. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,
FitzRoy, F. R., & Schwalbach, J. (1990). Managerial compensation and firm performance: Some evidence from West Germany. WZB, Discussion Paper, FS IV 90-20.
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008). Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1), 49–100.
Gersick, K. E., Davis, J. A., & Hampton, M. M. (1997). Generation to generation: Life cycles of family business. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.
Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. F. (2005). On REIT CEO compensation: Does board structure matter? The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,
Gianfrate, G. M. (2007). What do shareholders coalitions really want? Evidence from Italian voting trusts. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Larraza, M., & Makri, M. (2003). The determinants of CEO compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of Management Journal,
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nuñez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal,
Haid, A., & Yurtoglu, B. (2006). Ownership structure and executive compensation in Germany. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948926
Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J. (2002). Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(1), 3–42.
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. Journal of Finance,
Hayes, R. M., & Schaefer, S. (2000). Implicit contracts and explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance. Rand Journal of Economics,
Holthausen, R.W., & Larcker, D. F. (1993). Organizational structure and financial performance. Unpublished manuscript, Wharton School University of Pennsylvania.
Huse, M. (2000). Board of directors in SMEs: A review and research agenda. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development,
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of the internal control system. Journal of Finance,
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics,
Johnson, J. L., Daily, G. M., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1996). Boards of directors: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management,
Kaplan, S. (1994). Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the U.S. Journal of Political Economy,
Kraft, K., & Niederprum, A. (1999). Determinants of Management Compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization,
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance,
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance,
Lambert, R., Larcker, D., & Weigelt, K. (1993). The structure of organizational incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly,
Lester, R. H., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2006). Interorganizational familiness: How family firms use interlocking directorates to build community-level social capital. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
Llense, F. (2008). French CEO compensations: What is the cost of a mandatory upper limit? CESifo Working paper series no. 2402. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273535
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2009). Agency costs at dual-class companies. Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1697–1727.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2005). Family involvement, agency and performance in the Fortune 1000. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meetings, Honolulu, HI, August.
Murphy, K. J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics (Vol. 3). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mustakallio, M., Autio, E., & Zahra, S. H. (2002). Relational and contractual governance in family firms: effects on strategic decision making. Family Business Review, XV(3), 205–222.
Pagano, M., & Roell, A. (1998). The choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, monitoring, and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1991). The relative power of CEOs and boards of directors: associations with corporate performance. Strategic Management Journal,
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly,
Ramaswamy, K., Veliyat, R., & Gomes, L. (2000). A study of determinants of CEO compensation in India. Management International Review,
Randøy, T., & Nielsen, J. (2002). Company performance, corporate governance, and CEO compensation in Norway and Sweden. Journal of Management and Governance,
Rosen, S. (1982). Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings. Bell Journal of Economics,
Schmid, F. A. (1997). Vorstandsbezuge, Aufsichtsratsvergutung und Aktionärsstruktur. Zeitschrift fur Betriebswirtschaft,
Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., & Dino, R. (2002). Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms. Managerial and Decision Economics,
Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., Dino, R., & Buchholtz, A. (2001). Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science,
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance,
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992). The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics,
Sraer, D., & Thesmar, D. (2006). Performance and behavior of family firms: Evidence from the French stock market. ECGI working paper.
Volpin, P. F. (2002). Governance with poor investor protection: Evidence from top executive turnover in Italy. Journal of Financial Economics,
Ward, J. L. (1987). Keeping the family business healthy: How to plan for continuous growth, profitability, and family leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Westphal, J. D., Boivie, S., & Chng, D. (2006). The strategic impetus for social network ties: reconstituting broken CEO friendship ties. Strategic Management Journal,
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics,
Zona, F. (2001), La retribuzione degli amministratori delegati nelle società quotate. In G. Airoldi, & A. Zattoni (a cura di), Piani di stock options. Progettare la retribuzione degli amministratori. Milano, EGEA.