Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 145–166

Corporate governance, family ownership and performance

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10997-009-9093-x

Cite this article as:
Giovannini, R. J Manag Gov (2010) 14: 145. doi:10.1007/s10997-009-9093-x
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Abstract

Using a sample of 56 Italian IPOs issued between 1999 and 2005, several hypotheses are tested on the interplay between corporate governance, family ownership and performance. Specifically tested is which approach among all agency, stewardship, and contingency theory is most appropriate for Italian family firms. Findings suggest that board independence increases with family disinvestment at IPO, presence of venture capitalists, establishment of large and active boards, and existence of appointment and compensation committees. At the same time, results indicate that the presence of independent directors affects performance positively but with little statistical significance, while family involvement and the presence of execution committees negatively impact share performance.

Keywords

Corporate governanceFamily ownershipPerformanceAgency theoryStewardship theoryContingency theory

JEL Classification

G34G32L25

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of FinanceBocconi UniversityMilanItaly