Minding the Is-Ought Gap
- Campbell Brown
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The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true.
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- Minding the Is-Ought Gap
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Volume 43, Issue 1 , pp 53-69
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- Print ISSN
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Autonomy of ethics
- Campbell Brown (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK