Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 42, Issue 5, pp 767–782

R and Relevance Principle Revisited

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10992-012-9247-1

Cite this article as:
Yang, E. J Philos Logic (2013) 42: 767. doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9247-1

Abstract

This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others.

Keywords

RRMRelevance logic(Semi-)relevance principle

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyChonbuk National UniversityJeonjuKorea