Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 42, Issue 4, pp 635–641

An Intuitionistic Reformulation of Mally’s Deontic Logic


DOI: 10.1007/s10992-012-9242-6

Cite this article as:
Lokhorst, GJ.C. J Philos Logic (2013) 42: 635. doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9242-6


In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed a number of deontic postulates. He added them as axioms to classical propositional logic. The resulting system was unsatisfactory because it had the consequence that A is the case if and only if it is obligatory that A. We present an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally’s deontic logic. We show that this system does not provide the just-mentioned objectionable theorem while most of the theorems that Mally considered acceptable are still derivable. The resulting system is unacceptable as a deontic logic, but it does make sense as a lax logic in the modern sense of the word.


Deontic logic Intuitionistic logic Lax logic 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Section of Philosophy, Faculty of Technology, Policy and ManagementDelft University of TechnologyGA DelftThe Netherlands

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