Article

Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 285-315

An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts

  • Mathieu BeirlaenAffiliated withCentre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University (UGent) Email author 
  • , Christian StraßerAffiliated withCentre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University (UGent)
  • , Joke MeheusAffiliated withCentre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University (UGent)

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Abstract

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ OA, O A ∧ PA or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP r , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP r .

Keywords

Deontic logic Normative conflicts Paraconsistent logic Inconsistency-tolerance Nonmonotonic logic Adaptive logic