Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 285–315

An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts

Authors

    • Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy and Moral SciencesGhent University (UGent)
  • Christian Straßer
    • Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy and Moral SciencesGhent University (UGent)
  • Joke Meheus
    • Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy and Moral SciencesGhent University (UGent)
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3

Cite this article as:
Beirlaen, M., Straßer, C. & Meheus, J. J Philos Logic (2013) 42: 285. doi:10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3

Abstract

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ OA, O A ∧ PA or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP r , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP r .

Keywords

Deontic logic Normative conflicts Paraconsistent logic Inconsistency-tolerance Nonmonotonic logic Adaptive logic

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012