Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 41, Issue 2, pp 419–448

Logic and Ontological Pluralism


DOI: 10.1007/s10992-010-9167-x

Cite this article as:
Turner, J. J Philos Logic (2012) 41: 419. doi:10.1007/s10992-010-9167-x


Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different ways or modes of being. In contemporary guise, it is the doctrine that a logically perspicuous description of reality will use multiple quantifiers which cannot be thought of as ranging over a single domain. Although thought defeated for some time, recent defenses have shown a number of arguments against the view unsound. However, another worry looms: that despite looking like an attractive alternative, ontological pluralism is really no different than its counterpart, ontological monism. In this paper, after explaining the worry in detail, I argue that considerations dealing with the nature of the logic ontological pluralists ought to endorse, coupled with an attractive philosophical thesis about the relationship between logic and metaphysics, show this worry to be unfounded.


Ontological pluralismFree logicMany-sorted logicMetaphysicsNotational variantsLogical realismOntology

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of LeedsLeedsUK