Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 40, Issue 2, pp 165–205

A new kind of degree

Original Research

DOI: 10.1007/s10988-016-9200-9

Cite this article as:
Scontras, G. Linguist and Philos (2017) 40: 165. doi:10.1007/s10988-016-9200-9

Abstract

This paper presents a case study of the English noun amount, a word that ostensibly relies on measurement in its semantics, yet stands apart from other quantizing nouns on the basis of its existential interpretation. John ate the amount of apples that Bill ate does not mean John and Bill ate the same apples, but rather that they each ate apples in the same quantity. Amount makes reference to abstract representations of measurement, that is, to degrees. Its existential interpretation evidences the fact that degrees contain information about the objects that instantiate them. Outside the domain of nominal measurement, the noun kind exhibits behavior strikingly similar to that of amount; both yield an existential interpretation. This observation motivates re-conceiving of degrees as nominalized quantity-uniform properties—the same sort of entity as kinds. Thus, the semantic machinery handling kinds also handles degrees: as nominalized properties, degrees are instantiated by objects that hold the corresponding property; when instantiated by real-world objects, degrees (and kinds) deliver the existential interpretation.

Keywords

Degrees Measurement Kinds Nominalized properties Degree relatives 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Linguistics, School of Social SciencesUniversity of California, IrvineIrvineUSA