Talking about taste: disagreement, implicit arguments, and relative truth
- Isidora Stojanovic
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In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn (Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643–686, 2005), according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter (in addition to a possible world parameter) rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any sentence containing a taste predicate, and given any assignment of values to the relevant parameters, the two accounts predict the same truth value and are, in that sense, equivalent. I also look at possible reasons for preferring one account over the other. The phenomenon of “faultless disagreement” (cf. Kölbel, Truth without objectivity, 2002) is often believed to be one such reason. I argue, against Kölbel and Lasersohn, that disagreement is never faultless: either the two parties genuinely disagree, hence if the one is right then the other is wrong, or the two parties are both right, but their apparent disagreement boils down to a misunderstanding. What is more, even if there were faultless disagreement, I argue that relativism would fail to account for it. The upshot of my paper, then, is to show that there is not much disagreement between a contextualist account that models the judge parameter as an implicit argument to the taste predicate, and a relativist account that models it as a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation. The choice between the two accounts, at least when talking about taste, is thus, to a large extent, a matter of taste.
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- Talking about taste: disagreement, implicit arguments, and relative truth
Linguistics and Philosophy
Volume 30, Issue 6 , pp 691-706
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Predicates of taste
- What is said
- Implicit arguments
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS – Ecole Normale Superieure, 29 rue d’Ulm, Pavillon Jardin, 75005, Paris, France