Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 97–122

Forms and objects of thought

Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10988-006-9012-4

Cite this article as:
Pelczar, M.W. Linguistics & Philosophy (2007) 30: 97. doi:10.1007/s10988-006-9012-4

Abstract

It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises.

Keywords

Propositional attitudes

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNational University of SingaporeSingaporeSingapore