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Promises Schmomises

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In this piece, I argue that promises need not be kept just because they were made. This is not to say, however, that unwise, unhappy, and unfortunate promises do not generate obligations. When broken promises will result either in wrongful gains to promisors or wrongful losses to promisees, obligations of corrective justice will demand that such promises be kept if their breach cannot be fully repaired. Thus, when a broken promise will constitute a deliberate loss transfer for personal gain, the duty not to exact unjust enrichment (a wrongful gain) will require a promisor either to honor her promise or craft a means of ensuring that the promisee’s impoverishment is not traded for her enrichment. And when a broken promise will constitute the culpable imposition of a reliance-based injury on a nonculpable promisee (a wrongful loss), the duty to make others whole when one has purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly injured them will require one either to keep one’s promise or to fashion a remedy for its breach that ensures that the promisee is left no worse off than he would be had the promise not been made. This account explicitly parts ways with normative powers theories of promising. It places no weight at all on the raw fact that a promise has been made. Instead, it locates the gravamen of a promissory violation in the harm that is caused to a promisee who nonculpably relies upon and changes her position in anticipation of the prediction about the promisor’s future conduct that is embedded in his promise. Absent any adverse reliance on the part of a promisee, there is nothing that gives rise to an obligation of performance or repair on the part of the promisor. But this account is also to be distinguished from utilitarian theories that take promises to be instruments of wealth maximization that properly give way whenever the reason for honoring them speaks in favor of violating them. On my account, the balance of reasons for action that determines the morality of performance includes deontological rights and duties, agent-relative permissions, and Hohfeldian liberties. As I shall argue, even if one rightly concludes that one has no duty either to keep a promise or to craft a remedy for its breach, one must nevertheless remember that virtue requires one to be or become the kind of person who often goes beyond the call of duty. But the fact that virtue often requires us to do what we have no duty to do should not cause us to confuse its conditions with the conditions of right and wrong action. We have a duty to keep promises or to otherwise protect the reliance interests that they generate only when failing to do so will lead either to our own unjust enrichment or to others’ unjust injury. And this means that we have a duty to keep promises in far fewer circumstances than is commonly believed.

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Correspondence to Heidi M. Hurd.

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This article is dedicated to my colleague, Andrew Leipold, whose unwavering refusal ever to break a promise inspired me to question his assumptions about the nature of promises. I am grateful to numerous colleagues who advanced challenging arguments, questions, and hypotheticals that motivated, first, a long banishment of the piece to a dark corner under my desk, and ultimately a radical revision of the thesis that I had advanced in early drafts. Particular thanks go to Kimberly Ferzan for first motivating me to extract the piece from under my desk and for then generating so many challenging counter-arguments to its thesis as to threaten its return. Special thanks also go to Talbot Brewer, John Colombo, Leo Katz, Alistair Macleod, and Charles Tabb for extensive written comments on earlier versions of the article. I am grateful also to numerous colleagues who devoted considerable energy to generating puzzles that motivated important changes in the argument: Larry Alexander, Jason Brennan, Curtis Bridgeman, Ralph Brubaker, Thomas Campbell, David Faraci, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Lucan Gregory, Mitchell Green, John Hasnas, Peter Jaworski, Leo Katz, Andrew Leipold, Howard Lesnick, Loren Lomasky, Govind Persad, Stephen Ross, Abraham Singer, Larry Solum, Horatio Spector, and Wil Waluchow. Michael Moore has lived through the many reincarnations of this piece over the years, and has generously invested in each of them. I also owe a debt of thanks to those who engaged with versions of the article that were presented at the XXII World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy Conference in Grenada, Spain, and the XIII World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy Conference in Krakow, Poland, as well as at faculty workshops at the University of Illinois College of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the University of Virginia Department of Philosophy, the University of Melbourne School of Law, the Monash University Faculty of Law, the Queen’s University Department of Philosophy, Universidad Torcuato di Tella Law School, the McMaster University Department of Philosophy, and the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics (McDonough School of Business). I benefitted substantially from an informal workshop on this work hosted by Duke University law and philosophy faculty, as well as from the readings for, and contributions of participants at, the Roundtable on Promissory Obligations that I co-organized with Alistair Macleod and Michael Pratt at Queen’s University, and the Roundtable on the Moral Bindingness of Promises that I co-organized with Michael Moore and Kenneth Halcom at the University of Illinois. My thanks to Kenneth Halcom and Sheeroz Kamran for very helpful research, and my profound appreciation to Stephanie Davidson, the Associate Director of the University of Illinois Law Library, for saving me from innumerable mistakes. Finally, I am grateful to have received generous institutional support for this article from the Australian National University College of Law, the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics at the Georgetown McDonough School of Business, and the University of Illinois College of Law.

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Hurd, H.M. Promises Schmomises. Law and Philos 36, 279–343 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9290-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9290-8

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