Law and Philosophy

, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp 343–365

Defending the Right To Do Wrong

Authors

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10982-011-9126-x

Cite this article as:
Herstein, O.J. Law and Philos (2012) 31: 343. doi:10.1007/s10982-011-9126-x

Abstract

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong’. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual.

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011