Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics Authors
First Online: 05 October 2012 Received: 02 July 2012 Accepted: 08 July 2012 DOI:
Cite this article as: Benatar, D. J Ethics (2013) 17: 121. doi:10.1007/s10892-012-9133-7 Abstract
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky. Keywords Anti-natalism Betterness Procreation Quality of life Suicide Value References
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