Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics
- David Benatar
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In Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky.
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- Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics
The Journal of Ethics
Volume 17, Issue 1-2 , pp 121-151
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- Springer Netherlands
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- David Benatar (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa