The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 191–207

Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Auckland
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4

Cite this article as:
Pettigrove, G. J Ethics (2011) 15: 191. doi:10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4
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Abstract

Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so.

Keywords

JustificationNormative ethicsSelf-effacementVirtue ethics

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010