The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 1–13

Demandingness as a Virtue


DOI: 10.1007/s10892-007-9025-4

Cite this article as:
Goodin, R.E. J Ethics (2009) 13: 1. doi:10.1007/s10892-007-9025-4


Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.


moral demandingness moral satisficing 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy Program, Research School of Social SciencesAustralian National UniversityCanberraAustralia

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