Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 327–351

A Dynamic Logic of Agency II: Deterministic \({\mathcal{DLA}}\) , Coalition Logic, and Game Theory

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10849-009-9104-y

Cite this article as:
Lorini, E. J of Log Lang and Inf (2010) 19: 327. doi:10.1007/s10849-009-9104-y

Abstract

We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called \({\mathcal{DDLA}}\) (Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of agents and coalitions, and agentive and coalitional capabilities. In \({\mathcal{DDLA}}\) it is supposed that, once all agents have selected a joint action, the effect of this joint action is deterministic. In order to assess \({\mathcal{DDLA}}\) we prove that it embeds Coalition Logic. We then extend \({\mathcal{DDLA}}\) with modal operators for agents’ preferences, and show that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to capture the game-theoretic concepts of best response and Nash equilibrium.

Keywords

Coalition logicGame theory

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut de recherche en informatique de ToulouseUniversité de Toulouse, CNRSToulouse Cedex 9France