Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 91–115

Reference and perspective in intuitionistic logics

Authors

    • Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of Tennessee
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10849-006-9024-z

Cite this article as:
Nolt, J. JoLLI (2007) 16: 91. doi:10.1007/s10849-006-9024-z

Abstract

What an intuitionist may refer to with respect to a given epistemic state depends not only on that epistemic state itself but on whether it is viewed concurrently from within, in the hindsight of some later state, or ideally from a standpoint “beyond” all epistemic states (though the latter perspective is no longer strictly intuitionistic). Each of these three perspectives has a different—and, in the last two cases, a novel—logic and semantics. This paper explains these logics and their semantics and provides soundness and completeness proofs. It provides, moreover, a critique of some common versions of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic and suggests ways of modifying them to take account of the perspective-relativity of reference.

Keywords

Intuitionistic logicIntuitionismConstructivismReferenceKripke semantics

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006