Market Share Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Strategic delegation analysis has been limited to sales delegation cases, until Jansen et al. (International Journal of Industrial Organization 25:531–539, 2007) presented the case of market share delegation. In international trade theory, export rivalry and import protection have always attracted considerable attention. This paper assesses the influence upon optimal trade policy of introducing market share delegation in a trade duopoly context. It shows that delegation matters, and different forms of delegation coupled with asymmetric costs will imply different degrees of government intervention.
- Brander, J.A. and Spencer, B.J., “Tariff protection and imperfect competition,” in Kierzkowski, H. (ed.), Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford (Oxford University Press), pp. 194–206, 1984.
- Brander, J.A. and Spencer, B.J., “Export subsidies and international market share rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 18, pp. 83–100, 1985. CrossRef
- Clarke, R. and Collie, D.R., “Optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs under Bertrand duopoly,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 53, pp. 398–408, 2006. CrossRef
- Collie, D.R., “Optimum welfare and maximum revenue tariffs under oligopoly,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 38, pp. 398–401, 1991. CrossRef
- Colonques, R.M., “Delegation and international oligopoly,” Revista Española de Economía, vol. 14, pp. 269–286, 1997.
- Das, S.P., “Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 43, pp. 173–188, 1997. CrossRef
- De Meza, D., “Export subsidies and high productivity: Cause or effect?” Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 19, pp. 347–350, 1986. CrossRef
- Fershtman, C. and Judd, K.L., “Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly,” American Economic Review, vol. 77, pp. 927–940, 1987.
- Jansen, T., Van Lier, A., and Van Witteloostuijn, A., “A note on strategic delegation: The market share case,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 25, pp. 531–539, 2007. CrossRef
- Johnson, H.G., “Optimum welfare and maximum revenue tariffs,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 19, pp. 28–35, 1951–1952. CrossRef
- Mai, C.C. and Hwang, H., “Optimal export subsidies and marginal cost differentials,” Economics Letters, vol. 27, pp. 279–282, 1988. CrossRef
- Sklivas, S.D., “The strategic choice of managerial incentives,” Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 18, pp. 452–458, 1987. CrossRef
- Van Witteloostujin, A., “Bridging behavioral and economic theories of decline: Organizational inertia, strategic competition, and chronic failure,” Management Science, vol. 44, pp. 501–519, 1998. CrossRef
- Vickers, J., “Delegation and the theory of the firm,” Economic Journal (Supplement), vol. 95, pp. 138–147, 1985.
- Market Share Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Volume 9, Issue 1 , pp 49-56
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer US
- Additional Links
- market share delegation
- sales delegation
- asymmetric cost
- export subsidy
- import tariff
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung, 811, Taiwan, Republic of China
- 2. Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University, Tainan Hsien, 71003, Taiwan, Republic of China
- 3. Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, 710049, Shaanxi, People’s Republic of China