Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp 3–9

The Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism and Scientific Realism

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10838-012-9184-2

Cite this article as:
Busch, J. J Gen Philos Sci (2012) 43: 3. doi:10.1007/s10838-012-9184-2

Abstract

Confirmational holism is central to a traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism (IA). I argue that recent strategies for defending scientific realism are incompatible with confirmational holism. Thus a traditional formulation of IA is incompatible with recent strategies for defending scientific realism. As a consequence a traditional formulation of IA will only have limited appeal.

Keywords

IndispensabilityScientific realismConfirmational holism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyAarhus CDenmark