Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp 129–140

Carnap and Kuhn: On the Relation between the Logic of Science and the History of Science


DOI: 10.1007/s10838-011-9154-0

Cite this article as:
Uebel, T. J Gen Philos Sci (2011) 42: 129. doi:10.1007/s10838-011-9154-0


This paper offers a refutation of J. C. Pinto de Oliveira’s recent critique of revisionist Carnap scholarship as giving undue weight to two brief letters to Kuhn expressing his interest in the latter’s work. First an argument is provided to show that Carnap and Kuhn are by no means divided by a radical mismatch of their conceptions of the rationality of science as supposedly evidenced by their stance towards the distinction of the contexts of discovery and justification. This is followed by an argument to the effect that the fact that Carnap’s own work concentrated on formal aspects of scientific theories does not licence the conclusion that he thought historical investigations and concerns irrelevant for what we nowadays would rightly call “philosophy of science”.


Rudolf CarnapDistinction of contexts of discovery and justificationHistory of scienceThomas KuhnLogical empiricism

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy, School of Social SciencesThe University of ManchesterManchesterUK