Journal of Automated Reasoning

, Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 261–291

Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption

Authors

  • J. Courant
    • Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble 1), CNRS, Verimag
  • M. Daubignard
    • Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble 1), CNRS, Verimag
  • C. Ene
    • Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble 1), CNRS, Verimag
    • Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble 1), CNRS, Verimag
  • Y. Lakhnech
    • Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble 1), CNRS, Verimag
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10817-010-9186-x

Cite this article as:
Courant, J., Daubignard, M., Ene, C. et al. J Autom Reasoning (2011) 46: 261. doi:10.1007/s10817-010-9186-x

Abstract

Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. In this paper, we present a sound and automated procedure that allows us to verify that a generic asymmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare–Rogaway 1993, of Pointcheval at PKC’2000.

Keywords

Provable cryptographyAsymmetric encryptionAutomated verificationHoare logic

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010