, Volume 46, Issue 3-4, pp 261-291
Date: 03 Jul 2010

Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption

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Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. In this paper, we present a sound and automated procedure that allows us to verify that a generic asymmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare–Rogaway 1993, of Pointcheval at PKC’2000.

This work is partially supported by the ANR projects SCALP, AVOTE and SFINCS.