June 2013, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 434-449,
Open Access This content is freely available online to anyone, anywhere at any time.
Tax competition leading to strict environmental policy
We study tax competition when pollution matters. Most notably, we present a dynamic setting, where the supply of capital is endogenous. It is shown that tax competition may involve stricter environmental policy than the cooperative outcome.
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- Tax competition leading to strict environmental policy
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International Tax and Public Finance
Volume 20, Issue 3 , pp 434-449
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- Environmental policy
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