, Volume 14, Issue 5, pp 525-541
Date: 13 Sep 2006

Rent seeking and aid effectiveness

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Abstract

We introduce foreign aid and a rent seeking contest for public funds into the Barro (JPE 1990) growth model. We find that aid effectiveness depends on fiscal policies, the level of aid inflows and the quality of institutions that restrict appropriation of public funds by rent seeking agents. These results can be shown to be consistent with the best established findings in the empirical literature on aid effectiveness. Rent seeking may thus indeed be a major determinant of aid effectiveness. We further discuss how aid effectiveness depends on the way foreign aid is disbursed and on the determinants of institutional quality.

JEL Classification F35 · D72 · D9 · H2