Journal of Indian Philosophy

, Volume 40, Issue 5, pp 553–591

The Deceptive Simplicity of Nāgārjuna's Arguments Against Motion: Another Look at Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Chapter 2

Authors

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10781-012-9167-y

Cite this article as:
Arnold, D. J Indian Philos (2012) 40: 553. doi:10.1007/s10781-012-9167-y
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Abstract

This article—which includes a complete translation of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 2 together with Candrakīrti's commentary thereon—argues that notwithstanding the many different and often arcane interpretations that have been offered of Nāgārjuna's arguments against motion, there is really just one straightforward kind of argument on offer in this vexed chapter. It is further argued that this basic argument can be understood as a philosophically interesting one if it is kept in mind that the argument essentially has to do with whether a personal level of description will admit of an exhaustively impersonal explanation.

Keywords

NāgārjunaMadhyamakaMetaphysics

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012