Which preferred providers are really preferred? Effectiveness of insurers’ channeling incentives on pharmacy choice

  • Lieke H. H. M. Boonen
  • Frederik T. Schut
  • Bas Donkers
  • Xander Koolman
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10754-009-9055-5

Cite this article as:
Boonen, L.H.H.M., Schut, F.T., Donkers, B. et al. Int J Health Care Finance Econ (2009) 9: 347. doi:10.1007/s10754-009-9055-5

Abstract

Efficient contracting of health care requires effective consumer channeling. Little is known about the effectiveness of channeling strategies. We study channeling incentives on pharmacy choice using a large scale discrete choice experiment. Financial incentives prove to be effective. Positive financial incentives are less effective than negative financial incentives. Channeling through qualitative incentives also leads to a significant impact on provider choice. While incentives help to channel, a strong status quo bias needs to be overcome before consumers change pharmacies. Focusing on consumers who are forced to choose a new pharmacy seems to be the most effective strategy.

Keywords

Preferred provider choice Status quo bias Pharmacy market Willingness to pay Discrete choice experiments 

JEL Code

C1 I11 G22 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lieke H. H. M. Boonen
    • 1
  • Frederik T. Schut
    • 1
  • Bas Donkers
    • 2
  • Xander Koolman
    • 1
    • 3
  1. 1.Institute of Health Policy and ManagementErasmus University Medical CenterRotterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Marketing DepartmentErasmus UniversityRotterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.IPSE Studies, Faculty of Technology, Policy and ManagementDelftThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations