Husserl Studies

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 131–145

Phenomenological Reflections on the Possibility of First Philosophy

Authors

    • Department of Philosophy, College of HumanitiesSeoul National University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-009-9064-8

Cite this article as:
Lee, N. Husserl Stud (2010) 26: 131. doi:10.1007/s10743-009-9064-8
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Abstract

In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In Sect. 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic features of first philosophy in a relative sense.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009