Husserl Studies

, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 131–140

Husserl on Analyticity and Beyond

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-008-9038-2

Cite this article as:
Rosado Haddock, G.E. Husserl Stud (2008) 24: 131. doi:10.1007/s10743-008-9038-2

Abstract

Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views, which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008