Journal of Financial Services Research

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 5–20

Regulator Scrutiny and Bank CEO Incentives


DOI: 10.1007/s10693-007-0023-2

Cite this article as:
Webb, E. J Finan Serv Res (2008) 33: 5. doi:10.1007/s10693-007-0023-2


This study analyzes the effects of monitoring intensity on compensation and turnover for CEOs of publicly-traded banks. Using a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs from highly-rated institutions receive smaller pay than CEOs from competing institutions, and that monitoring intensity, as proxied by CEO age, influences the relationship between market performance and executive incentives. These findings suggest that regulatory ratings and CEO age impact optimal bank governance structure by varying incentive sensitivity to market performance.


Banksregulatory ratingsCEO compensation

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Supervision, Regulation and CreditFederal Reserve Bank of PhiladelphiaPhiladelphiaUSA