Experimental Economics

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 14–44

Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?

  • R. Mark Isaac
  • Svetlana Pevnitskaya
  • Timothy C. Salmon

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9227-7

Cite this article as:
Isaac, R.M., Pevnitskaya, S. & Salmon, T.C. Exp Econ (2010) 13: 14. doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9227-7


Preferences for charitable giving in auctions can be modeled by assuming that bidders receive additional utility proportional to the revenue raised by an auctioneer. The theory of bidding in the presence of such preferences results in a very counterintuitive prediction which is that, in many cases, bidders having preferences for charitable giving does not lead to a substantial revenue advantage for an auctioneer. We test this theory and this prediction with a series of experiments. In one experiment we induce charitable preferences exactly as specified in the model to see if bidders respond to them as predicted. We find that they do. We then conduct a second experiment in which the revenue from the auctions is donated to actual charities to verify the robustness of the prediction when charitable preferences are generated by a more natural source and find again that the theoretical prediction holds: even strong charitable preferences do not result in substantial revenue increases to the auctioneer.


AuctionsCharitable givingEconomic experiments

JEL Classification


Supplementary material

10683_2009_9227_MOESM1_ESM.xlsx (190 kb)
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. (xlsx 1.14 MB)
10683_2009_9227_MOESM2_ESM.xlsx (1.1 mb)
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. (xlsx 189 KB)
10683_2009_9227_MOESM3_ESM.pdf (79 kb)
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. (pdf 78.8 KB)

Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. Mark Isaac
    • 1
  • Svetlana Pevnitskaya
    • 1
  • Timothy C. Salmon
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA