Experimental Economics

, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 26–41

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

  • Wolfgang J. Luhan
  • Martin G. Kocher
  • Matthias Sutter
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9188-7

Cite this article as:
Luhan, W.J., Kocher, M.G. & Sutter, M. Exp Econ (2009) 12: 26. doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9188-7

Abstract

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

Keywords

ExperimentDictator gameTeam behaviorSocial preferences

JEL

C72C91C92D70

Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wolfgang J. Luhan
    • 1
  • Martin G. Kocher
    • 2
    • 3
  • Matthias Sutter
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Center for Social Science MethodologyUniversity of OldenburgOldenburgGermany
  2. 2.Department of Economics, CREEDUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Department of Public FinanceUniversity of InnsbruckInnsbruckAustria
  4. 4.Department of EconomicsUniversity of GöteborgGöteborgSweden