Experimental Economics

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 315–335

Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence


  • Sugato Dasgupta
    • Centre for Economic Studies and PlanningJawaharlal Nehru University
  • Kirk A. Randazzo
    • Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Kentucky
  • Reginald S. Sheehan
    • Department of Political ScienceMichigan State University
    • Department of Political ScienceMichigan State University

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9167-z

Cite this article as:
Dasgupta, S., Randazzo, K.A., Sheehan, R.S. et al. Exper Econ (2008) 11: 315. doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9167-z


This paper studies a situation wherein a set of voters choose between two alternatives in the presence of a payoff externality. Specifically, regardless of her intrinsic preference, a voter’s payoff is maximized should she vote for the alternative that garners a majority of the votes cast. Are votes coordinated on a single alternative? Using laboratory experiments, we examine voting patterns in sequential voting and simultaneous voting elections. Across both election types, we also vary the amount of information that an individual voter has regarding the intrinsic preferences of the other voters. Our main findings are as follows. In the “low” information treatment, sequential voting elections facilitate coordinated voting. However, in the “high” information treatment, voting patterns are not dependent on how the election is structured.


Payoff externalityCoordinated votesSequential electionSimultaneous electionInformation


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© Economic Science Association 2007