Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp 449–463

Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10677-012-9352-9

Cite this article as:
Carlson, E. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2013) 16: 449. doi:10.1007/s10677-012-9352-9
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Abstract

John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.

Keywords

Value comparisons “Better than” Vagueness Incomparability John Broome Cristian Constantinescu 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden