Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp 449-463

First online:

Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle

  • Erik CarlsonAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Uppsala University Email author 

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John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.


Value comparisons “Better than” Vagueness Incomparability John Broome Cristian Constantinescu