Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 113–137

Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics


DOI: 10.1007/s10677-011-9312-9

Cite this article as:
Mower, D.S. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2013) 16: 113. doi:10.1007/s10677-011-9312-9


Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits.


Situationism Confucian Virtue ethics Moral development Xunzi Character traits Moral psychology Ritual Doris Harman 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesYoungstown State UniversityYoungstownUSA

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