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Some Versions of the Number Problem Have No Solution

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Abstract

This article addresses Taruek’s much discussed Number Problem from a non-consequentialist point of view. I argue that some versions of the Number Problem have no solution, meaning that no alternative is at least as choice-worthy as the others, and that the best way to behave in light of such moral indeterminacy is to let chance make the decision. I contrast my proposal with F M Kamm’s nonconsequentialist argument for saving the greatest number, the Argument for Best Outcomes, which I argue does not follow from the premises it is based on.

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Notes

  1. It is worth keeping in mind that the distinction between consequentailsim and nonconsequentialism we are operating with here is a fairly traditional one. Although we pressuppose that consequentialists always assign final value to well-being or preference satisfaction, it is of course true that some people who call themselves consequentialists assign final value to others things, such as fairness. According to the present, somewhat narrow terminology, those people will here count as nonconsequentialists. The reason for preferring this terminology is that it is line with Taurek’s terminology in his (1977).

  2. In Kamm’s earlier writings, including Morality, Mortaility: Vol 1, the same argument was referred to as the Aggregation Argument.

  3. There is, of course, a huge literature on whether ‘better than’ is a transitive relation. For an overview, see e.g. Peterson (2009a).

  4. See Peterson (2009b) for a consequentialist defence of the Mixed View.

  5. The most extensive discussion of this view can be found in Hirose (2004). See also Broome (1998) and Hirose (2007). Finally, Lawlor (2006) also makes some remarks that seem to tally well with the Mixed View.

  6. For a recent discussion of methods for aggregating fairness, see e.g. Karini and Safra (2002).

  7. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at a conference in Oxford in honour of professor Frances Kamm on the 29th of November 2008, organised by the Uheiro Centre for practical ethics and the Faculty of Philosophy. I would like to thank professor Kamm and the participants for very stimulating and helpful comments. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for valuable suggestions and advice.

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Correspondence to Martin Peterson.

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Peterson, M. Some Versions of the Number Problem Have No Solution. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 13, 439–451 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9213-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9213-3

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