Abstract
The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The topic of this paper is moral status, defined as the status of beings as objects of moral consideration, not as moral subjects. I leave aside the question what makes something a moral subject or agent.
From now on, when I speak of infants, I mean human infants.
People come to rationalism from two directions. First, from a Kantian viewpoint, one assumes that moral subjects are the basic objects of moral concern. Given that rationality is part of being a moral subject, one then concludes that the moral status of a being is dependent upon its rational capacities. Second, one may think that the basic objects of moral concern are beings that have interests, irrespective of whether they are moral subjects. If one then thinks that high moral status is dependent upon having certain kinds of interests and that having these interests is dependent upon rational capacities, then high moral status becomes indirectly dependent upon rationality; see (Tooley 1983, pp. 95–122; Singer 1993, pp. 95–99, 181–184; Korsgaard 2004, pp. 103–104). A looser, indirect connection between moral status and rational capacities ensues if one makes moral status dependent upon the value or quality of life for the relevant individual and then links the possible quality of life with rationality capacities; see (Harris 1985, pp. 14–21; Singer 1993, pp. 105–109, 183–191).
Of course, the defenders of such a position will have additional reasons for thinking that humans have the highest possible moral status on account of being human. For example, most Christians will think that this is the case on account of the special status granted to humans by God; see (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1999, pp. 203–204). There are also ways at arriving at thesis (2) that would imply a partial rejection of (1). Robert Spaemann thinks that all humans have the highest possible moral status simply because they are humans. But since this status of all humans has something to do with the (rational) characteristics of normal members of the human species, this approach does not exclude that all members of another species may also have such a status, assuming that the normal members of this other species have such species-characteristics (Spaemann 1996, pp. 11, 259–264). Although Spaemann’s position is not logically inconsistent, the two components of the position do not sit well with each other. If moral status is really dependent upon rational capacities, how can severely disabled infants who never could develop such capacities have the same moral status as individuals who have or could have these capacities? It seems that membership in the same species as individuals who can develop such capacities is not a good reason for granting them the same moral status.
See (Singer 1993, pp. 10–26, 55–62; Wolf 1990, pp. 75–120, 127–128; 1997, pp. 59–75). Singer’s thought has both an animalist and a rationalist strand. Being eager to avoid anthropocentrism, he thinks that the capacity to suffer is at the basis of moral status, but allows rational capacities to indirectly affect moral status, given that they may be relevant to questions of the value of life and of painless killing (Singer 1993, pp. 101–134).
From now on, when I speak of animals, I mean non-human animals.
See (Warren 1997, pp. 152–153). For captive or domesticated animals, membership in a social community is the basis of an enhanced moral status (pp. 168–170).
The whole quote is in italics in the original. The “same moral rights” are naturally granted only “[w]ithin the limits” of the capacities of these human beings and of the principle that holds for moral agents (Warren 1997, p. 164).
Such accounts are exemplified by theories that aim to understand morality on the basis of the relation of caring; see e.g. (Noddings 2003).
I leave aside the issue whether some sophisticated version of utilitarianism can justify the right to life. To distinguish between the moral status of different beings, it is useful to work with a simple act-utilitarianism.
I do not want to exclude that there may be cases in which it would be justified or required to kill one human being to save others. But it would be justified on account of a conflict of duties, rather than for utilitarian reasons.
This is of course a simplification. We may also have a duty to protect species from extinction. But this is a duty that does not concern solely species capable of suffering.
It is sometimes objected that the concept of moral status implausibly requires an abrupt difference in kind in moral treatment where there are in fact only gradual differences. Given that my concept of moral status stands for the strength of duties, it does not have any such implication. However, the substantive account of moral status that I am giving would seem to face this problem: We have utilitarian duties to the simple animals, whereas our duties to the complex animals involve considering them to be moral individuals. But surely the differences between the simple and complex animals are gradual. How are we to justify treating one animal in a borderline case as a moral individual, but another one in a utilitarian way? The answer to this question is to be found in my discussion of the concept person in Section 6.
In thinking that humans have a higher moral status, I disagree with such authors as Tom Regan, who argues that all animals that are a “subject-of-a-life” have the same right to respectful treatment as humans (Regan 2004, pp. 239–248, 279–280). Regan argues that this is compatible with assuming that, in a lifeboat situation, one should sacrifice the dog if one had to choose between the dog and the humans in the boat. His reason for this view is that in such a situation one has to sacrifice the one who is harmed the least by it and that is the dog (pp. xxvii–xxxii, 324–325). Such a view would seem to imply that, if one had to choose, one should save a great ape rather than a severely disabled infant out of a burning forest, on the assumption that the harm to the great ape would be greater. That is incompatible with the higher moral status I assign to severely disabled infants. (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 380–388) faces the same difficulty.
For a recent philosophical discussion of this literature, see (DeGrazia 1996, pp. 166–210).
As (Clark 1997, pp. 16–30) argues, such a view does not imply that we are required to start protecting animals against their natural predators.
This claim will be qualified and clarified in Section 7.
I am not assuming that it is correct to sacrifice the severely disabled infant rather than other people in the boat. The point of the example is simply that we are choosing between a severely disabled infant and a wild great ape.
See (Seel 1995, pp. 294–295).
See (Seel 1995, pp. 295–297).
Of course, in a world in which animals are kept, more human beings than those actually keeping them have responsibility for the decent treatment of these animals. All I am saying is that not all human beings will have the strong duties to these animals that we have to severely disabled infants.
The original inspiration for my account was (Seel 1995). However, I am not sure that he would agree with the view just proposed. There are possible disagreements in, as it were, two opposite directions. On the one hand, he seems to think that all humans have the highest possible moral status (Seel 1995, pp. 277–278). Given the starting point of his theory, I am not sure that he is entitled to this conclusion (see note 26). That is not the point here, but rather that in this case he would be setting the bar for the highest moral status for humans ‘lower’ than I do. On the other hand, his central notion is not human but rather personal dependency (Seel 1995, pp. 272–278, 294–301, 316–317). This is not surprising, given that his starting point is morality understood as a relationship between persons. But that is not the point here. I am not sure how exactly to understand his notion. If it means that an infant is dependent on a relationship that the infant can somehow appreciate as a personal relationship, then Seel would, in effect, be setting the bar for the highest possible moral status for humans ‘higher’ than I do, given that I do not think that any such appreciation is necessary for a human relationship: With respect to the question which infants have the highest possible moral status, he would for this reason face the same difficulty as rationalism. (It is understood that in all these cases we are talking of severely disabled infants in my sense: They never had and are incapable of ever having rational capacities greater than the great apes).
When McCormick emphasizes “the potential for human relationships associated with the infant’s condition” (p. 175) as a guideline for life-and-death decisions in cases of severely disabled infants, he seems to be concerned with the importance of human relationships for the quality of life (McCormick 1974, pp. 172–176). Árnason seems to favor such a two-level approach, and he also mentions the importance of the fact that “humans are related to persons in a special way” (p. 216) for the moral status of humans. But he seems to assume that all humans are related to persons in this way and have—in my terms—the highest possible moral status (Árnason 2003, pp. 228–234; 2005, pp. 238–246). This last assumption means that he—like anthropocentrism—would violate the first intuition expressed in Section 2.
We surely have other kinds of duties to a moral subject than we have to humans who are not moral subjects. However, I see no reason to assume that, other things being equal, we have a stronger duty not to kill a moral subject than not to kill a severely disabled infant. Thus, I assume that moral subjects and severely disabled infants both have the highest possible moral status, but my arguments concerning the comparative moral status of the great apes and the severely disabled is not dependent on this assumption.
Some such theories are Kantian approaches such as (Kant 1979, pp. 239–241; Habermas 1993, pp. 107–111; Seel 1995, pp. 274–276, 303–305) and contractarian views. Although it is easiest to argue against such theories by assuming that the severely disabled have the highest possible moral status, this assumption is not necessary for this purpose: Such theories also cannot explain why the severely disabled—those who never could become moral subjects—have necessarily a higher moral status than the great apes.
See (Hanley 1997, pp. 12–19).
See also (Birnbacher 2001). I omit much from Birnbacher’s own argument. I simply present what I take to be the essence of the problem.
A classic contemporary discussion of such a list is (Dennett 1976).
See also (DeGrazia 1997, pp. 310–314).
Perhaps not. (Sapontzis 1993, pp. 270–271) thinks that there is a purely “evaluative” use of the term “person”; the same assumption is made in (Tooley 1972, pp. 37–65); contrast (Tooley 1983, p. 51). I do not want to argue about the use of words. I am interested in a certain concept, for which the word ‘person’ is often used.
I am aware of only one place where this is mentioned, namely (DeGrazia 1997, pp. 319–37). Although he does not ultimately commit himself on this issue, DeGrazia is skeptical that person is indeed such a concept (pp. 312–316).
In his criticism of the thesis that all metaphysical persons are moral persons, (Stoecker 1997) assumes, in effect, that, according to this thesis, the conditions of application of ‘metaphysical person’ are to be understood purely descriptively and all entities that fall under this term have a certain moral status. Because I understood person as an NDS-concept, Stoecker’s criticism of this thesis does not apply to my defense of the justificatory role of person.
This shows that—in his discussion of the possibility that person is a thick concept—DeGrazia is wrong to conclude that “personhood … is descriptively redundant” (DeGrazia 1997, p. 314).
The fact that an individual is a person requires that we treat this individual with respect rather than in a utilitarian manner. My account thus has a Kantian flavor and shares with Regan’s theory the ambition of extending respect beyond the human species. Given this similarity to Regan’s ideas, two important differences should be noted. First, in Regan’s theory inherent value is the only fundamental basis of moral status. Given that, according to Regan, humans and many animals have inherent value, there is no way for him to assign a higher moral status to humans than to animals (Regan 2004, pp. 235–248, 279–280). In my account, personhood is not the only basis of moral status. Thus, great apes that are persons can have a lower moral status than humans. Second, Regan’s concept of a subject-of-a-life and my concept of a person are importantly different. Irrespective of the possible difference in the extensions of the two concepts, the former is purely descriptive, whereas the latter is an NDS-concept.
Another important difference between my account of the moral status of severely disabled infants and Seel’s is that his account does not discuss any role played by NDS-concepts.
References
Anderson E (1993) Value in Ethics and Economics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass
Árnason V (2003) Siðfræði lífs og dauða: Siðfræði lífs og dauða: Erfiðar ákvarðanir í heilbrigðismálum, 2nd ed. University of Iceland Press, Reykjavík
Árnason V (2005) Dialog und Menschenwürde: Ethik im Gesundheitswesen, deutsche Übersetzung von (Árnason 2003). LIT Verlag, Münster
Birnbacher D (1997) Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs. In: Strasser P, Starz E (eds) Personsein aus bioethischer Sicht. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, pp 9–25
Birnbacher D (2001) Selbstbewußte Tiere und bewußtseinsfähige Maschinen: Grenzgänge am Rand des Personenbegriffs. In: Sturma D (ed) Person: Philosophiegeschichte, theoretische Philosophie, praktische Philosophie. Mentis, Paderborn, pp 337–362
Clark SRL (1997) The Rights of Wild Things. In: Clark SRL (ed) Animals and their moral standing. Routledge, London, pp 16–30
DeGrazia D (1996) Taking animals seriously: mental life and moral status. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
DeGrazia D (1997) Great apes, dolphins, and the concept of personhood. South J Philos 35:301–320
Dennett D (1976) Conditions of personhood. In: Rorty AO (ed) The identities of persons. University of California Press, Berkeley, pp 175–196
Gunnarsson L (2000) Making moral sense: beyond Habermas and Gauthier. Canbridge University Press, Cambridge
Gunnarsson L (2000–2001) Er skynsamlegt að vera dyggur, trúr og tryggur? Hugur 12–13:7–22
Gunnarsson L (2003) Af skynsemispostulum og náttúrudýrkendum. In: Gunnarsson L, Kristjánsson K (eds) Heimspekimessa, University of Iceland Press, Reykjavík, pp 213–228
Habermas J (1993) Justification and application: remarks on discourse ethics, trans. by Ciaran Cronin. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass
Hanley R (1997) Is Data Human? The Metaphysics of Star Trek. Basic Books, New York
Hare RM (1963) Freedom and Reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Harris J (1985) The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Kant I (1979) Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield. Methuen, London
Kirschenmann PP (2002) Why is the notion of person also descriptively problematic? In Kanzian C, Quitterer J, Runggaldier E (eds) Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Papers of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 10, pp 103–105
Korsgaard CM (2004) Fellow creatures: Kantian ethics and our duties to animals, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Retrieved February 4, 2008, from The Tanner Lectures Web site: http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/atoz.html#k
McCormick RA (1974) To save or let die: the dilemma of modern medicine. J Am Med Assoc 229:172–176
McDowell J (1979) Virtue and Reason. Monist 62:331–350
McDowell J (1981) Non-cognitivism and rule-following. In: Holtzmann SH, Leich CM (eds) Wittgenstein: to follow a rule. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp 141–162
Noddings N (2003) Caring: a feminine approach to ethics and moral education, 2nd ed. with a new preface. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles
Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, New York
Nussbaum MC (2006) Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species membership. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass
Olson ET (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford
Patterson F, Gordon W (1993) The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas. In: Cavalieri P, Singer P (eds) The great ape project: equality beyond humanity. St. Martin’s Griffin, New York, pp 58–77
Quante M (2002) Personales Leben und menschlicher Tod: Personale Identität als Prinzip der biomedizinischen Ethik. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main
Rawls J (1972) A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Regan T (2004) The Case for Animal Rights, updated with a new preface. University of California Press, Berkeley
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1999) Declaration on Euthanasia. In: Kuhse H, Singer P (eds) Bioethics: an anthology. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 203–207
Sapontzis SF (1993) Aping persons—pro and con. In: Cavalieri P, Singer P (eds) The great ape project: equality beyond humanity. St. Martin’s Griffin, New York, pp 269–277
Seel M (1995) Versuch über die Form des Glücks: Studien zur Ethik. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main
Singer P (1993) Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Singer P (1994) Rethinking life and death: the collapse of our traditional ethics. St. Martin’s Griffin, New York
Spaemann R (1996) Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen ‘etwas’ und ‘jemand’. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart
Stoecker R (1997) Metaphysische Personen als moralische Personen. Allg Z Philos 22:245–271
Tooley M (1972) Abortion and Infanticide. Philos Public Aff 2:37–65
Tooley M (1983) Abortion and Infanticide. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Warren MA (1997) Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Williams B (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass
Wils J-P (1997) ‘Person’-ein sinnloser Begriff in der Ethik. In: Strasser P, Starz E (eds) Personsein aus bioethischer Sicht. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, pp 26–42
Wolf U (1990) Das Tier in der Moral. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main
Wolf U (1997) Haben wir moralische Verpflichtungen gegen Tiere? In: Krebs A (ed) Naturethik: Grundtexte der gegenwärtigen tier-und ökoethischen Diskussion. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, pp 47–75
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following persons for their very helpful written comments and queries: Nadja El Kassar, Simon Hailwood, Stephen K. McLeod, Lutz Wingert and two anonymous referees for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. In addition, I would like to thank audiences at the University of Dortmund and the University of Akureyri for valuable discussions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gunnarsson, L. The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 11, 305–326 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9107-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9107-9