Abstract
In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
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Notes
Standard Gettier cases are Gettier cases involving what Pritchard (2009, 591) calls ‘intervening luck’, such as the sheep case Vaesen also discusses. Notice that the present account does not claim to deal with non-standard Gettier cases, i.e. Gettier cases involving what Pritchard (2009, 591) calls ‘environmental luck’, such as the fake barn case. Notice, however, that Sosa (2010) offers one account of these cases and, in (Kelp 2011, 2013b, 2013c), I consider three alternatives that are compatible with the present account of competence manifestation.
Note that it is compatible with this that Sissi’s cognitive competence is not what’s most salient in the causal explanation of her cognitive success. In fact, this is plausibly what happens in SISSICASE: the case is set up in such a way that causal salience lies with the upgraded technology, not with her competence. This is how competence manifestation and causal salience differ [as Sosa already notes in his earlier work (Sosa 2007, 86–87)].
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Harmen Ghijsen and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this paper. This work was funded by a postdoctoral research fellowship with Research Foundation—Flanders.
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Kelp, C. Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen. Erkenn 79, 729–732 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3