Are Chemical Kind Terms Rigid Appliers?
- Michael Rubin
- … show all 1 hide
Purchase on Springer.com
$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
According to Michael Devitt, the primary work of a rigidity distinction for kind terms is to distinguish non-descriptional predicates from descriptional predicates. The standard conception of rigidity fails to do this work when it is extended to kind terms. Against the standard conception, Devitt defends rigid application: a predicate is a rigid applier iff, if it applies to an object in one world, it applies to that object in every world in which it exists. Devitt maintains that rigid application does the job of identifying nondescriptional predicates perfectly. I argue that Devitt is wrong about this. When we examine more closely alternative theories about the identity and persistence conditions of those entities to which mass terms apply, we find no plausible theory that has the result that a term is rigid iff it is non-descriptional.
- Barnett, D. (2004). Some stuffs are not sums of stuffs. Philosophical Review, 113, 89–100. CrossRef
- Burge, T. (1977). A theory of aggregates. Nous, 11, 97–117. CrossRef
- Burke, M. (1994). Preserving the principle of one object to a place: A novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 591–624. CrossRef
- Cook, M. (1980). If ‘cat’ is a rigid designator, what does it designate? Philosophical Studies, 37, 61–64. CrossRef
- Devitt, M. (2005). Rigid application. Philosophical Studies, 125, 139–165. CrossRef
- Devitt, M., & Sterelny, K. (1999). Language and reality (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Donnelly, M., & Bittner, T. (2009). Summation relations and portions of stuff. Philosophical Studies, 143, 167–185. CrossRef
- Fine, K. (1999). Things and their parts. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74. CrossRef
- Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- LaPorte, J. (2000). Rigidity and kind. Philosophical Studies, 97(5), 293–316. CrossRef
- Laycock, H. (1972). Some questions of ontology. Philosophical Review, 81, 3–42. CrossRef
- Schwartz, S. P. (2002). Kinds, general terms, and rigidity: A reply to LaPorte. Philosophical Studies, 109, 265–277. CrossRef
- Soames, S. (2002). Beyond rigidity. New York: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Zimmerman, D. (1995). Theories of masses and problems of constitution. Philosophical Review, 104, 53–110. CrossRef
- Are Chemical Kind Terms Rigid Appliers?
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Michael Rubin (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophy, M207, The University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA, 6009, Australia