Original Article


, Volume 78, Issue 1, pp 73-94

First online:

A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis’ Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals

  • Stefan DragulinescuAffiliated withUniversité Paris-Sorbonne, Centre Léon Robin (UMR 8061) Email author 

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I question here the differentiation of kinds as substantive universals in Lowe and Ellis’ metaphysics, by taking up, for the argument’s sake, two extreme approaches on kind differentiation and kind change, a Heraclitan and a Spinozan approach. I show that, as things currently stand, Heraclitanism or Spinozism about kinds is consistent with the broad tenets of Lowe and Ellis’ metaphysics of kinds.